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22
The Court’s ruling failed to address the issues
regarding the Request for Admissions deemed
Admitted and Petitioner’s Summary Judgment
Motion.
REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD
BE GRANTED
A. The Memorandum and Order of Judge
Surrick Reflects Widespread Uncertainty
over the Meaning of Standing, which
this Court Alone Can Dispel.
The very essence of civil liberty, wrote Chief
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137 (1803), certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. Against the
backdrop of historical Supreme Court precedent
beginning with Marbury and extending through
Sprint Communications Co. L.P. v. APCC Services
Inc., __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 2531 (2008), the better23
informed “test” for the injury-in-fact prong of the
standing doctrine analysis more resembles a “sliding
scale” of factors and variables operating as a function
of the speculative nature and/or remoteness of the
allegations. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Federal Election
Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998); Sprint
Communications Co. L.P. v. APCC Services Inc., __
U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 2531 (2008); Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
184 (2000).
In Morton, this Court held that the
environmentalist Petitioners had standing, as injury
to “aesthetic and environmental well-being” was
enough to adequately constitute personal “stake” and
24
injury in fact. 405 U.S. at 734. Subsequently, in
Hunt, this Court held that despite a lack of personal
“stake,” an association has standing to bring suit so
long as the interests in question are relevant to the
organization’s purpose and regardless of whether the
claims asserted or relief requested involve the
individual members of the organization. 432 U.S. at
343. Furthermore, in Laidlaw, a case stemming
from noncompliance with the Clean Water Act, this
Court noted the importance of a Petitioner’s
demonstration of standing but followed up by stating
that “it is wrong to maintain that citizen Petitioners
facing ongoing violations never have standing to seek
civil penalties.” 528 U.S. at 184. More recently, in
Akins, this Court rendered a decision maintaining
that individual voters’ inability to obtain alleged
public information met the injury in fact
requirement, as it helped to ensure that the Court
25
will adjudicate “a concrete, living contest between
adversaries.” 524 U.S. at 21. Similarly and finally,
in APCC, decided by this Court in June 2008, the
conventional, “personal stake” approach promulgated
in cases such as Lujan and Baker gave way to the
idea that the “personal stake” requirement and the
three requirements of standing — injury in fact,
causation and redressibility — are “flip sides of the
same coin” and are simply two different ways of
ensuring that each case or controversy presents “that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination.” APCC, 128 S.Ct.
at 2543.
The case at hand may lack the specificity of
injury in fact required by Lujan, but the allegations
from which the action arises are no more speculative
or remote than the importance of environmental
26
aesthetics of Morton or the party disconnect evident
in Hunt. The foundation of the claims presented by
Mr. Berg, the will to avoid a certain constitutional
crisis, certainly amount to a “personal stake,” but in
the case that this Court may deem otherwise, the
underlying claims absolutely present the adversarial
contest under which standing was found in the
recent decisions in Akins and APCC.
Without a doubt, the Respondents will note
that the premise behind Akins was the failure to
obtain information, and will attempt to distinguish
APCC because it involves standing in the context of
contracts, assignors and assignees. However, Mr.
Berg has indeed sought information vital to the
election process put forth in the U.S. Constitution,
and this Court in APCC stated that, apart from
historical precedent for permitting suits by assignees
under assignments for collection, “[i]n any event, we
27
find that the assignees before us satisfy the Article
III standing requirements articulated in more recent
decisions of this Court.” Furthermore, this Court’s
treatment of the standing doctrine in APCC should
be enough to show that the reasoning exhibited by
the district court judge, grounded in Lujan,
misperceives the three prongs of standing as
enunciated just four months ago by this Court.
Therefore, because of the reasons stated above,
because of the “sliding scale” nature of a “test” for
injury in fact, because the very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives
an injury, this Court should hold that Mr. Berg has
standing to prosecute this action and reverse the
decision from the district court which maintains
otherwise.
28
B. The Memorandum and Order from the
District Court are Incorrect. The
Promises made by Obama and the DNC
Clearly Fall Under Promissory Estoppel
Barack Obama and the DNC made promises to
the Petitioner and to the American people,
reasonably expecting — in fact, counting on the idea
— that the promises would induce reliance, those
promises induced the Petitioner to expend money
and billable hours and the American public to donate
more than $600 million to Obama’s campaign, and
injustice can only be avoided by adjudication in this
Court.
A cause of action under promissory estoppel
arises when a party relies to his detriment on the
intentional or negligent representations of another
party, so that in order to prevent the relying party
from being harmed, the inducing party is estopped
from showing that the facts are not as the relying
29
party understood them to be. Thomas v. E.B. Jermyn
Lodge No. 2, 693 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 1997)
(citing Rinehimer v. Luzerne County Community
College, 539 A.2d 1298, 1306 (Pa. Super.), app.
denied, 555 A.2d 116 (1988)). Promissory estoppel is
applied to enforce a promise which is not supported
by a binding contract. Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Mem’l.
Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
promissory estoppel is unwarranted in light of court’s
finding that parties formed an enforceable contract);
Bosum Rho v.Vanguard OB/GYN Assocs., P.C.,
No.Civ.A.98-167, 1999 WL 228993, at *6 (E.D.Pa.
Apr. 15, 1999).
With regard to the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, it is manifested, and not actual, intent
which is paramount. The question is not what
Obama and the DNC actually intended, as Judge
Surrick claimed in his Memorandum, but rather
30
what the Petitioner and the American public, as
promises, were justified in understanding that intent
to be. There is no sound reason to suffer the harms
in question because the U.S. District Court, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania incorrectly dismissed the
Promissory Estoppel claim. Judge Surrick claimed
the DNC’s promises were not actually promises but
instead of statement of intentions. Judge Surrick
went on further claiming, “The ‘promises’ that
Petitioner identifies arc statements of principle and
intent in the political realm. They are not enforceable
promises under contract law. Indeed, our political
system could not function if every political message
articulated by a campaign could be characterized as
a legally binding contact enforceable by individual
voters. Of course, voters are free to vote out of office
those politicians seen to have breached campaign
promises and Federal courts, however, are not and
31
cannot be in the business of enforcing political
rhetoric.”
The DNC and Obama made promises in
writing which were posted on their website to lure
people to donate money based on their promises. The
DNC named this document “Renewing America’s
Promise,” which presents the 2008 Democratic
National Platform. In this document, the DNC
promises among other things “use technology to
make government more transparent, accountable
and inclusive,” “maintain and restore our
Constitution to its proper place in our government
and return our Nation to the best traditions,
including their commitment to government by law”
and “work fully to protect and enforce the
fundamental Constitutional right of every American
vote — to ensure that the Constitution’s promise is
fully realized”.
32
Obama placed on his website and stated on
national television his promise to open and honest
Government and his promise to truthfully answer
any questions asked of him.
As a result of his detrimental reliance on these
promises, Petitioner donated money and billable
hours to Democratic Presidential candidates as well
as the Democratic National Committee.
The DNC did in fact break promises by
promoting an illegal candidate to run for and serve, if
elected, as President of the United States, clearly in
violation of the United States Constitution and in
violation of their promise to enforce the fundamental
Constitutional rights of every American voter.
Furthermore, Obama has not answered, in an honest
manner, questions about his citizenship. Moreover,
Obama has breached his promise to uphold our
Constitution; Obama is a Constitutional lawyer and

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